July 19, 2026, 8:54 AM · Data Story · 12 min read
EU ETS proposal could add 1.29 billion to 1.61 billion gross allowances through 2040
The European Commission proposed a slower decline in the EU carbon-market cap on 17 July 2026. On a fixed 2026 sector boundary, Cumulant Research calculates that the proposal could create 1.29 billion to 1.61 billion more gross allowances through 2040 than current law, although allowances issued are not the same as emissions released.
By Cumulant Research
Hover or tap an underlined term to see its definition.

The quick version
- The proposal adds about 1.04 billion base-cap allowances if suitable international credits are unavailable and 1.36 billion if they are available.
- Including the proposed 250 million removal-linked cap increase lifts gross additional allowance room to 1.29 billion to 1.61 billion.
- That is 14.9% to 18.5% above the comparable current-law allowance budget for 2026-2040.
- The allowance path changes after 2035 because the annual reduction factor would be 1.7% unless suitable credits are unavailable, in which case it would revert to 2.7%.
- The result measures potential allowance issuance, not future emissions, carbon prices, industrial output or the proposal's economic effect.
Figure
The proposal opens two allowance paths after 2035
Annual allowances on a fixed 2026 sector boundary, excluding later sector additions and the separate removal-linked increase
The vertical axis starts at zero. Current law is floored at zero in 2040 as an analytical convention. The proposal's separate 250 million removal-linked increase is excluded because its annual auction schedule would be set later.
Source: Cumulant Research calculation from the European Commission's 2025 Carbon Market Report, current ETS Directive and COM(2026) 616: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=COM%3A2025%3A735%3AFIN | https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02003L0087-20240301 | https://climate.ec.europa.eu/document/download/c0b4ca8e-0e12-4b4e-9976-98c0b4224410_en?filename=com_2026_616_en.pdf · million allowances · 2026-2040
Why it matters
A larger long-run allowance budget could alter expectations about future carbon-market scarcity and the compliance environment facing European power generators, manufacturers, airlines and shipping operators. The proposal also ties carbon-market supply to international credits and permanent removals, potentially directing substantial funding toward carbon-management projects. The estimated allowance increase should not be interpreted as an equivalent increase in emissions or as a forecast of carbon prices.
The finding
By Cumulant Research | 18 July 2026
The European Commission did not propose a single allowanceallowanceAn allowance is a transferable permit that can be surrendered for one metric tonne of carbon-dioxide-equivalent emissions. path after 2035. It proposed a fork. Article 9 sets the annual linear reduction factorlinear reduction factorThe linear reduction factor is the percentage of a fixed historical reference quantity removed from the cap each year. at 3.7% for 2031-2035 and 1.7% from 2036. Article 9b says the factor would revert to 2.7% if suitable high-quality, high-integrity and cost-effective international credits are unavailable. Source: https://climate.ec.europa.eu/document/download/c0b4ca8e-0e12-4b4e-9976-98c0b4224410_en?filename=com_2026_616_en.pdf
Holding the market's 2026 sector boundary constant, Cumulant Research calculates that the slower decline would add 1.044 billion base-capcapThe cap is the total quantity of allowances created for covered emissions in a particular year. allowances through 2040 under the credit-unavailable path and 1.356 billion under the credit-available path. Those are cumulative differences from a comparable continuation of current law, not figures published directly by the Commission. Calculation inputs: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=COM%3A2025%3A735%3AFIN and https://climate.ec.europa.eu/document/download/c0b4ca8e-0e12-4b4e-9976-98c0b4224410_en?filename=com_2026_616_en.pdf
Proposed Article 9c separately increases the cap by 250 million allowances for auctions during 2031-2040, with the revenue intended to buy an equivalent quantity of certified permanent removals. Adding that increase produces 1.294 billion to 1.606 billion of gross additional allowance room. Source: https://climate.ec.europa.eu/document/download/c0b4ca8e-0e12-4b4e-9976-98c0b4224410_en?filename=com_2026_616_en.pdf
Figure
The proposal opens two allowance paths after 2035
Annual allowances on a fixed 2026 sector boundary, excluding later sector additions and the separate removal-linked increase
The vertical axis starts at zero. Current law is floored at zero in 2040 as an analytical convention. The proposal's separate 250 million removal-linked increase is excluded because its annual auction schedule would be set later.
Source: Cumulant Research calculation from the European Commission's 2025 Carbon Market Report, current ETS Directive and COM(2026) 616: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=COM%3A2025%3A735%3AFIN | https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02003L0087-20240301 | https://climate.ec.europa.eu/document/download/c0b4ca8e-0e12-4b4e-9976-98c0b4224410_en?filename=com_2026_616_en.pdf · million allowances · 2026-2040
How we reconstructed the cap
The calculation starts with two official 2026 quantities. The Commission reported 1,185,420,090 allowances for electricity and heat generation, industrial production and maritime transport, plus 24,903,076 for aviation. Together they make 1,210,323,166 allowances on the fixed boundary used here. Source: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=COM%3A2025%3A735%3AFIN
The same report gives the 2026 annual reduction as 87,913,405 allowances for the main cap and 1,330,226 for aviation. Their sum, 89,243,631, is the reduction produced by a 4.3% factor. Dividing that reduction by 4.3% gives an implied combined reference quantityreference quantityThe reference quantity is the fixed allowance base used to calculate the annual reduction rather than the previous year's shrinking cap. of about 2.075 billion allowances. The percentage is applied to this fixed reference quantity each year, much as a staircase removes equal-height steps rather than a constant share of the remaining staircase. Source: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=COM%3A2025%3A735%3AFIN
For current law, we subtract 4.3% of the reference quantity in 2027 and 4.4% each year from 2028. For the proposal, we follow the same path through 2030, subtract 3.7% annually in 2031-2035, and then subtract either 2.7% or 1.7% annually. Current law otherwise produces a negative calculated quantity in 2040, so we stop issuance at zero for that year. The zero floor is our analytical convention, not language added to the Directive. Current-law factors: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02003L0087-20240301. Proposed factors: https://climate.ec.europa.eu/document/download/c0b4ca8e-0e12-4b4e-9976-98c0b4224410_en?filename=com_2026_616_en.pdf
Figure
Gross allowance room rises 14.9% to 18.5%
Cumulative 2026-2040 allowances on the fixed 2026 boundary
Bars start at zero. The gross cases add the proposed 250 million removal-linked cap increase. They do not add the international-credit financing pool or the removal-financing backstop because both are drawn from within the base cap.
Source: Cumulant Research calculation from official 2026 cap quantities, annual reductions and COM(2026) 616: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=COM%3A2025%3A735%3AFIN | https://climate.ec.europa.eu/document/download/c0b4ca8e-0e12-4b4e-9976-98c0b4224410_en?filename=com_2026_616_en.pdf · billion allowances · 2026-2040
Why the result is a range
Both proposed paths use 3.7% in 2031-2035. That slower first step adds 217.9 million allowances relative to current law over those five years. The paths separate in 2036 because a one-percentage-point difference in the reduction factor compounds across the remaining annual caps. Cumulant's reconstruction puts the cumulative difference between the 1.7% and 2.7% paths at 311.3 million allowances for 2036-2040. Sources and calculation inputs: https://climate.ec.europa.eu/document/download/c0b4ca8e-0e12-4b4e-9976-98c0b4224410_en?filename=com_2026_616_en.pdf and https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=COM%3A2025%3A735%3AFIN
The lower end of the range is therefore the path with no suitable international credits. That result can sound backward until the mechanism is clear: unavailable credits trigger the faster 2.7% cap decline, leaving fewer allowances. Available credits allow the slower 1.7% decline and the larger allowance budget. Source: https://climate.ec.europa.eu/document/download/c0b4ca8e-0e12-4b4e-9976-98c0b4224410_en?filename=com_2026_616_en.pdf
Figure
Four steps reconcile the additional allowance range
Additions relative to the fixed-boundary current-law budget
| Component | Treatment | Added allowances |
|---|---|---|
| Slower decline, 2031-2035 | Included in both base paths | 217.9m |
| Post-2035 fallback contribution | Included if credits are unavailable | 826.4m |
| Credit-available path effect | Added when 1.7% applies instead of 2.7% | 311.3m |
| Removal-linked cap increase | Included in the gross result | 250.0m |
| Gross additional room | Unavailable-to-available range | 1,294.3m-1,605.6m |
Component values use unrounded annual calculations. The international-credit financing facility is not an extra-cap component.
Source: Cumulant Research calculation from Articles 9, 9b and 9c of COM(2026) 616 and the official 2026 cap inputs: https://climate.ec.europa.eu/document/download/c0b4ca8e-0e12-4b4e-9976-98c0b4224410_en?filename=com_2026_616_en.pdf | https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=COM%3A2025%3A735%3AFIN · million allowances · 2031-2040
The 260 million credit facility is inside the cap
Article 9b would make up to 260 million allowances from the Union-wide cap available to finance the purchase of up to 260 megatonnes of qualifying international credits. The words from the Union-wide quantity matter: these allowances are earmarked from the cap rather than added on top of it. Their direct increment in our calculation is therefore zero. Source: https://climate.ec.europa.eu/document/download/c0b4ca8e-0e12-4b4e-9976-98c0b4224410_en?filename=com_2026_616_en.pdf
Credit availability still changes the cap indirectly because it determines which post-2035 reduction factor applies. If the earmarked allowances are not used to buy credits, Article 9b says they would be allocated to the Industrial Decarbonisation Bank rather than removed automatically from the cap. Source: https://climate.ec.europa.eu/document/download/c0b4ca8e-0e12-4b4e-9976-98c0b4224410_en?filename=com_2026_616_en.pdf
Figure
Not every large allowance number enlarges the cap
Provisions separated by their effect on the fixed-boundary calculation
| Provision | Direct cap increment | Treatment |
|---|---|---|
| Slower reduction factors | 1,044.3m-1,355.6m | Counted in base result |
| International-credit financing | 0 | Up to 260m allowances earmarked within the cap |
| Credit availability | 311.3m range effect | Determines whether 1.7% or 2.7% applies after 2035 |
| Removal-linked increase | 250m | Counted in gross result |
| Removal-financing backstop | 0 | Up to 10m allowances taken from within the cap |
| Later waste, shipping and aviation additions | Not calculated | Excluded from the fixed 2026 boundary |
Later scope additions would enlarge both covered emissions and the cap. They are excluded because counting their allowances as additional room for sectors covered in 2026 would not be a like-for-like comparison.
Source: European Commission proposal, Articles 9, 9b and 9c: https://climate.ec.europa.eu/document/download/c0b4ca8e-0e12-4b4e-9976-98c0b4224410_en?filename=com_2026_616_en.pdf · allowances or credits
The 250 million removal increase is gross, not free of conditions
Article 9c would increase the cap by 250 million allowances and make them available for auctionauctionAn allowance auction is a sale in which eligible market participants bid for emissions permits. from 2031 through 2040. The Commission would use the proceeds to purchase an equivalent quantity of certified domestic permanent removals generated by BioCCSBioCCSBioenergy with carbon capture and storage captures carbon from biological material and places it in long-term storage. and DACCSDACCSDirect air capture with carbon storage uses machinery to remove carbon dioxide from ambient air and store it.. The reduction factor would not apply to this 250 million increase. Source: https://climate.ec.europa.eu/document/download/c0b4ca8e-0e12-4b4e-9976-98c0b4224410_en?filename=com_2026_616_en.pdf
Calling this gross allowance roomgross allowance roomGross allowance room is the number of additional permits before subtracting any carbon removals or later cancellations intended to balance their climate effect. is essential. The permits increase the quantity companies could surrender, while the linked removals are meant to offset their climate effect. The proposal also requires corresponding allowances to be cancelled if operators directly use qualifying BioCCS removals, and it leaves the auction timing and purchasing details to delegated acts. Source: https://climate.ec.europa.eu/document/download/c0b4ca8e-0e12-4b4e-9976-98c0b4224410_en?filename=com_2026_616_en.pdf
A further backstop of up to 10 million allowances could finance removal purchases if the first auctions raise insufficient revenue. Those allowances would come from within the Union-wide quantity, so they do not add another 10 million to the cap in this analysis. Source: https://climate.ec.europa.eu/document/download/c0b4ca8e-0e12-4b4e-9976-98c0b4224410_en?filename=com_2026_616_en.pdf
Why the Commission's 911 megatonnes is not our starting point
The impact assessment shows a modeled 2030 EEAEEAThe European Economic Area combines the European Union with Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway in a shared economic area. cap of 911 megatonnes for scenarios that include outgoing extra-EEA aviationextra-EEA aviationExtra-EEA aviation means flights between the European Economic Area and destinations outside it.. It explicitly says those figures include international extra-EEA aviation and maritime emissions other than carbon dioxide while excluding waste. That 911 figure belongs to a broader modeled scope and is not evidence that the proposal immediately adds 911 million allowances or emissions. Source: https://climate.ec.europa.eu/document/download/6dffbc5a-b5f3-4c51-b999-a6243e155e8c_en?filename=swd_2026_616_part_1_en.pdf
The same impact assessment presents 847 megatonnes in 2030 when extra-EEA aviation is excluded from that target scope. Our legal reconstruction reaches 847.122 million allowances in 2030 because it freezes the sectors and geographic coverage represented by the official 2026 allowance quantities. The close match is a useful cross-check, but the impact-assessment tables are modeled scenarios rather than the statutory calculation used here. Sources: https://climate.ec.europa.eu/document/download/6dffbc5a-b5f3-4c51-b999-a6243e155e8c_en?filename=swd_2026_616_part_1_en.pdf and https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=COM%3A2025%3A735%3AFIN
Allowances are not the same as emissions
The calculation measures the number of permits that could exist under the stated legal paths. It does not predict how many permits would be auctioned in a particular year, how many companies would bank, how many would be placed in the Market Stability ReserveMarket Stability ReserveThe Market Stability Reserve changes auction supply when the number of unused allowances in circulation becomes unusually large or small., or how many tonnes operators would emit. The reserve changes auction supply in response to the allowance surplus, while operators surrendersurrenderTo surrender an allowance is to use and cancel it to cover one tonne of verified emissions. allowances against verified emissionsverified emissionsVerified emissions are operator-reported emissions that have been checked under the ETS monitoring and verification system.. Sources: https://climate.ec.europa.eu/eu-action/carbon-markets/eu-emissions-trading-system-eu-ets/market-stability-reserve_en and https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02003L0087-20240301
Nor is the additional allowance count an estimate of the proposal's effect on carbon prices, electricity prices, output, investment or employment. Those outcomes depend on demand, production, fuel and technology costs, expectations, bankingbankingBanking means keeping an unused allowance for compliance in a later year. and the final design adopted by lawmakers. The Commission's impact assessment models economic and environmental outcomes under specified assumptions, while this article performs a narrower legal quantity reconstruction. Source: https://climate.ec.europa.eu/document/download/6dffbc5a-b5f3-4c51-b999-a6243e155e8c_en?filename=swd_2026_616_part_1_en.pdf
What happens next
COM(2026) 616 is a legislative proposallegislative proposalA legislative proposal is draft law that can be amended or rejected before taking effect.. The European Parliament and Council can amend it before adoption, including the reduction factors, credit facility, removal mechanism and sector expansions. Source: https://climate.ec.europa.eu/document/download/c0b4ca8e-0e12-4b4e-9976-98c0b4224410_en?filename=com_2026_616_en.pdf
Under the proposed text, the Commission would publish the revised Union-wide allowance quantity by September 2028. It would report by 31 January 2033 on the integrity, accounting, supply, demand and ETS implications of international credits. The conditional 1.7% or 2.7% path would begin in 2036. Source: https://climate.ec.europa.eu/document/download/c0b4ca8e-0e12-4b4e-9976-98c0b4224410_en?filename=com_2026_616_en.pdf
Figure
The upper and lower paths will not be resolved immediately
17 Jul 2026
Commission publishes proposal
The European Parliament and Council can amend or reject it.
By Sep 2028
Revised cap publication due
The proposal requires the Commission to publish the Union-wide allowance quantity.
2031
3.7% factor begins
Removal-linked auctions may also begin, with timing set through later rules.
31 Jan 2033
Credit-market assessment due
The Commission must assess integrity, accounting, supply, demand and implications for the EU ETS.
2036
Conditional path begins
The factor is 1.7% unless suitable credits are unavailable, in which case it reverts to 2.7%.
Source: COM(2026) 616, Articles 9, 9b and 9c: https://climate.ec.europa.eu/document/download/c0b4ca8e-0e12-4b4e-9976-98c0b4224410_en?filename=com_2026_616_en.pdf · 2026-2036
What to watch
- Whether the European Parliament or Council changes the proposed reduction factors, 250 million allowance increase or international-credit provisions.
- The revised Union-wide allowance quantity that the Commission would publish by September 2028.
- Evidence on the integrity, availability and cost of qualifying international credits before the Commission's January 2033 review.
- Delegated rules governing the timing of removal-linked auctions and purchases of BioCCS and DACCS removals.
How we did this
- We used the official 2026 quantities of 1,185,420,090 main-cap allowances and 24,903,076 aviation allowances, producing a fixed-boundary starting value of 1,210,323,166. Source: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=COM%3A2025%3A735%3AFIN
- We combined the official 2026 annual reductions of 87,913,405 and 1,330,226 allowances. Dividing their 89,243,631 total by the 4.3% factor gives the fixed reference quantity used for subsequent annual reductions. Source: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=COM%3A2025%3A735%3AFIN
- The current-law path subtracts 4.3% of the reference quantity in 2027 and 4.4% annually from 2028. The 2040 result is floored at zero rather than allowed to become negative. Source for the statutory factors: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02003L0087-20240301
- The proposal path follows current law through 2030, subtracts 3.7% annually in 2031-2035 and then subtracts either 2.7% or 1.7% annually in 2036-2040. Source: https://climate.ec.europa.eu/document/download/c0b4ca8e-0e12-4b4e-9976-98c0b4224410_en?filename=com_2026_616_en.pdf
- We summed annual allowance quantities for 2026-2040. This gives 8.661 billion under current law, 9.706 billion under the proposal if suitable credits are unavailable and 10.017 billion if they are available.
- We subtracted the current-law total from each proposal total, producing base-cap increases of 1.044 billion and 1.356 billion.
- We then added the 250 million Article 9c cap increase, producing gross additional allowance room of 1.294 billion to 1.606 billion. Source: https://climate.ec.europa.eu/document/download/c0b4ca8e-0e12-4b4e-9976-98c0b4224410_en?filename=com_2026_616_en.pdf
- We excluded later additions for municipal waste incineration, smaller ships, offshore ships not already represented in the 2026 quantities and expanded aviation coverage. This keeps the comparison on one sector boundary.
- All displayed totals are rounded only after the annual calculations. Minor differences may therefore appear when readers add rounded chart labels.
What this cannot establish
- The result describes a Commission proposal, not enacted law. Parliament and Council may change the quantities, dates, factors or mechanisms.
- The calculation freezes the sector boundary represented by the official 2026 cap quantities. It excludes later additions for waste, smaller ships, offshore ships not already included and expanded aviation coverage.
- The zero floor in the current-law 2040 path is an analytical convention. The current Directive states a continuing linear reduction but does not specify the negative-cap treatment used here.
- The 250 million removal-linked increase is a maximum gross addition. Auction timing, removal purchases and possible cancellations could reduce the number ultimately issued or left available.
- The credit-available path depends on a future assessment of whether qualifying international credits are sufficiently available and meet integrity and cost criteria.
- The inferred reference quantity uses the official 2026 annual reduction. The Commission's required 2028 publication could incorporate later legal, scope or administrative adjustments.
- The calculation does not estimate allowance prices, auction revenue, verified emissions, industrial production, electricity prices, investment, employment or the net climate effect.
- The Market Stability Reserve and banking can change the timing and quantity of allowances reaching auctions or circulation without changing the statutory cap calculation shown here.
This is AI-assisted analysis under stated assumptions; it is not investment advice or a price target. Figures are as of the publication date and trace to the cited sources; markets and disclosures change.
Sources
- 01COM(2026) 616 final, Proposal amending the EU ETS Directive and Market Stability Reserve Decision, European CommissionPrimary
- 02SWD(2026) 616 final, Part 1 of 5, EU ETS review impact assessment, European CommissionPrimary
- 03COM(2025) 735 final, Report on the functioning of the European carbon market in 2024, European CommissionData
- 04Consolidated Directive 2003/87/EC establishing the EU ETS, EUR-LexPrimary
- 05Commission Decision (EU) 2023/1575 on the Union-wide quantity of allowances for 2024, European CommissionPrimary
- 06Commission Decision (EU) 2024/1797 on the aviation allowance quantity, European CommissionPrimary
- 07EU Emissions Trading System, European Commission Directorate-General for Climate ActionPrimary
- 08EU ETS emissions cap, European Commission Directorate-General for Climate ActionPrimary
- 09Market Stability Reserve, European Commission Directorate-General for Climate ActionPrimary
- 10Regulation (EU) 2024/3012 establishing the Union certification framework for carbon removals and carbon farming, EUR-LexPrimary
Related
The IEA's 9% mining-investment decline does not measure rare-earth factory finance
On [16 July 2026](https://www.iea.org/news/supply-concentration-export-restrictions-and-declining-investment-put-critical-mineral-security-at-risk), the IEA reported that investment by a sample of major mining companies fell in 2025. Our review finds that the figure cannot show whether financing for rare-earth refineries and magnet factories outside China rose or fell because those projects, financing instruments and disbursements were not measured separately.

Seven OPEC+ producers' June shortfall to IEA targets was 38 times their September adjustment
On 2 August, [seven OPEC+ producers approved a combined 188,000-barrel-a-day production adjustment for September](https://www.opec.org/pr-detail/611-2-august-2026.html). Our reconstruction of the [IEA's June estimates](https://www.iea.org/reports/oil-market-report-july-2026) found a 7.20 million-barrel-a-day shortfall to its implied targets, but that comparison measures scale, not compliance, future production or price impact.

Early ship movements cannot isolate the Encelia attack's effect on Saudi crude traffic
Three loaded tankers changed course after the Houthis' July 20 blockade declaration but before Encelia was struck on July 22. Two supertankers subsequently carried a combined 4 million barrels through Bab el-Mandeb while two inbound ships hesitated, so the first observations show disruption but cannot reveal how much the attack added. [Reuters on the reversals](https://ca.marketscreener.com/news/two-tankers-carrying-saudi-crude-make-u-turns-in-red-sea-after-houthi-warning-ce7f51d8db8df624) [Reuters on the later movements](https://www.boursorama.com/bourse/actualites-amp/deux-superpetroliers-chinois-transportant-du-petrole-saoudien-quittent-la-mer-rouge-0b79445b582b6280d89e6aaacc1818c4)

Reported Saudi nuclear package would give the IAEA narrower standard access than the UAE model
[Energy Secretary Chris Wright confirmed President Donald Trump's approval of a U.S.-Saudi civil-nuclear agreement](https://www.foxbusiness.com/video/6401836768112), but its legal text and safeguards annex were not public at Cumulant Research's 1:00 p.m. ET cutoff on July 22, 2026. The available instruments support a conditional finding: Saudi Arabia would remain under comprehensive IAEA safeguards and reportedly receive targeted monitoring, but without an Additional Protocol the agency would lack the UAE model's standard wider declarations and complementary-access rights if Saudi enrichment proceeds.
