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August 3, 2026, 2:10 PM · Data Story · 10 min read

Production responses, not delivery delays, drove most of July's PMI jump

[ISM's Manufacturing PMI rose from 53.3 in June to 55.6 in July](https://www.ismworld.org/supply-management-news-and-reports/reports/ism-pmi-reports/pmi/july/). Cumulant's reconstruction attributes 1.26 of the 2.28 points recoverable from ISM's rounded components to production responses and 0.30 point to slower deliveries, weakening the supply-delay explanation without proving that factories produced more goods.

By Cumulant Research

Hover or tap an underlined term to see its definition.

Aerial photograph of a large manufacturing plant and warehouses in Tampa, Florida.
An aerial view of GAF's manufacturing facility in Tampa, Florida, illustrates the physical factory sector measured by national manufacturing indicators. Photo: Porcinipal, CC0, via Wikimedia Commons

The quick version

  • [July's PMI reading of 55.6 was 2.3 points above June and the highest since May 2022](https://www.ismworld.org/supply-management-news-and-reports/reports/ism-pmi-reports/pmi/july/).
  • Production supplied 55.3 percent of the reconstructed increase, while slower deliveries supplied 13.2 percent, using [ISM's rounded component changes and equal-weight formula](https://www.ismworld.org/supply-management-news-and-reports/reports/ism-pmi-reports/pmi/july/).
  • The survey measures how widespread reported improvement was, not the number or value of goods produced.
  • [Official manufacturing output rose 1.67 percent between January and June](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/data/IPMAN), but July output had not been published when this article was prepared.
  • July factory hours are scheduled for [August 7](https://www.bls.gov/ces/publications/news-release-schedule.htm), followed by July manufacturing output on [August 18](https://www.federalreserve.gov/Releases/G17/release_dates.htm).

Figure

Official data show a first-half rebound, not yet a July acceleration

Both series are normalized to January 2026 = 100

100100.84101.67JanFebMarAprMayJun
Real outputAggregate hours

The vertical range may be narrowed because both series share a common 100 baseline and the purpose is to compare small changes. Real output rose 1.67 percent and aggregate hours rose 0.44 percent between January and June. June output and hours were preliminary in their source releases.

Source: Cumulant calculations from [Federal Reserve manufacturing output](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/data/IPMAN) and [BLS aggregate manufacturing hours](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/data/CES3000000016). · Index, January 2026 = 100 · January-June 2026

Why it matters

The decomposition weakens the interpretation that July's stronger manufacturing signal was mainly an artifact of supply delays. For markets and manufacturers, however, it remains a survey-based indication rather than confirmation of faster physical production. Workers and businesses will receive an initial supporting signal from factory-hours data on August 7, followed by the first direct official estimate of July manufacturing output on August 18: https://www.bls.gov/ces/publications/news-release-schedule.htm and https://www.federalreserve.gov/Releases/G17/release_dates.htm

The finding

By Cumulant Research

[ISM's July Manufacturing PMIManufacturing PMIThe Manufacturing Purchasing Managers' Index is an [ISM survey measure that equally weights new orders, production, employment, supplier deliveries, and inventories](https://www.ismworld.org/supply-management-news-and-reports/reports/ism-pmi-reports/pmi/july/). rose 2.3 points to 55.6, its highest reading since May 2022](https://www.ismworld.org/supply-management-news-and-reports/reports/ism-pmi-reports/pmi/july/). Because the headline combines five equally weighted components, the published changes allow a reconstruction of which survey responses supplied the increase.

Answer

Production responses drove most of the reconstructed increase. Production's 6.3-point rise contributes 1.26 points after applying its 20 percent weight. The 1.5-point increase in slower supplier deliveries contributes 0.30 point. Production therefore accounts for 55.3 percent of the reconstructed 2.28-point increase, compared with 13.2 percent from slower deliveries, using [ISM's rounded componentcomponentA component is one of the five survey indexes combined to calculate the Manufacturing PMI. changes and equal-weight formula](https://www.ismworld.org/supply-management-news-and-reports/reports/ism-pmi-reports/pmi/july/).

The arithmetic does not support the narrow claim that delivery delays generated most of July's jump. It also does not establish that factories produced substantially more goods. ISM measures the breadth of reported change, while the [Federal Reserve's manufacturing index estimates real output](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/IPMAN).

How the reconstruction works

[ISM equally weights new orders, production, employment, supplier deliveries, and inventories](https://www.ismworld.org/supply-management-news-and-reports/reports/ism-pmi-reports/pmi/july/). Multiplying each published June-to-July change by 0.20 produces contributions of 0.14, 1.26, 0.62, 0.30, and -0.04 point, respectively.

Those five contributions sum to 2.28 points, while the reported headline rose 2.3 points. The 0.02-point gap is consistent with the fact that ISM publishes the component readings and changes to one decimal place, but the exact source of the residual cannot be proved without unrounded values.

Think of the survey as a vote count, not a warehouse scale. A diffusion indexdiffusion indexA diffusion index measures how widespread change is by combining the share reporting improvement with half the share reporting no change, rather than counting how many goods were produced. can show that improvement was reported by a wider share of factories without showing whether each factory added one unit or one million units. The calculation can identify which survey category moved the headline, but it cannot measure the size of the physical-output change.

Why production looks broader than a supply-chain artifact

[ISM asks respondents whether conditions changed from the previous month and constructs diffusion indexes from the shares reporting positive, unchanged, or negative conditions](https://www.ismworld.org/supply-management-news-and-reports/reports/ism-pmi-reports/pmi/july/). Its panel is organized by industry and weighted according to industries' contributions to the economy.

[Twelve of the 18 manufacturing industries reported higher production in July, six reported no change, and none reported lower production](https://www.ismworld.org/supply-management-news-and-reports/reports/ism-pmi-reports/pmi/july/). Fifteen industries reported overall growth, and four of the six largest manufacturing industries expanded.

That breadth makes a production-led survey move more plausible than a result confined to one disrupted supply route. It remains descriptive evidence, however. The survey does not identify how much extra output each responding company produced, and the calculation cannot establish that reported production caused the headline increase through any mechanism beyond the PMI formula.

Delivery delays still mattered

[The Supplier Deliveries IndexSupplier Deliveries IndexThe Supplier Deliveries Index rises when deliveries become slower, so congestion can lift the PMI even if production volume does not increase. rose from 57.4 to 58.9, and readings above 50 mean deliveries were slower](https://www.ismworld.org/supply-management-news-and-reports/reports/ism-pmi-reports/pmi/july/). Thirteen industries reported slower deliveries, while none reported faster deliveries.

The correct conclusion is therefore not that supply pressure disappeared. Slower deliveries added 0.30 point to the reconstructed PMI increase. They were a contributor, but their contribution was less than one-quarter of production's 1.26-point contribution.

The remaining reconstructed movement came from employment, which contributed 0.62 point; new orders, which contributed 0.14 point; and inventories, which subtracted 0.04 point. These figures follow directly from [ISM's published changes and 20 percent weights](https://www.ismworld.org/supply-management-news-and-reports/reports/ism-pmi-reports/pmi/july/).

What the official data already show

The latest available government data provide useful backdrop but not a July verdict. In the current data vintage, the [Federal Reserve's manufacturing-output index rose from 97.0786 in January to 98.6995 in June](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/data/IPMAN), a 1.67 percent increase. The [BLS aggregate-hours index rose from 91.0 to 91.4](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/data/CES3000000016), or 0.44 percent.

Figure

Official data show a first-half rebound, not yet a July acceleration

Both series are normalized to January 2026 = 100

100100.84101.67JanFebMarAprMayJun
Real outputAggregate hours

The vertical range may be narrowed because both series share a common 100 baseline and the purpose is to compare small changes. Real output rose 1.67 percent and aggregate hours rose 0.44 percent between January and June. June output and hours were preliminary in their source releases.

Source: Cumulant calculations from [Federal Reserve manufacturing output](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/data/IPMAN) and [BLS aggregate manufacturing hours](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/data/CES3000000016). · Index, January 2026 = 100 · January-June 2026

Those figures show that the first half already contained an output rebound. They cannot confirm that the pace accelerated in July because neither government series yet contains a July observation. The [Federal Reserve labels June industrial-production data preliminary](https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g17/current/table0.htm), and the [BLS marks the latest hours observations preliminary](https://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.t20.htm).

Why hours are supporting evidence, not the verdict

[BLS calculates aggregate hours from employment and average weekly hours](https://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.t20.htm). That makes the measure useful for asking whether factories used more employee time, but it does not directly measure the goods produced during that time.

Output and hours can diverge because productivityproductivityProductivity is the amount of output produced per unit of labor input, so output can rise without a matching increase in hours., industry mix, measurement error, and later revisions can change the relationship. Between the second- and third-quarter averages of 2022, the current data show [manufacturing output falling 0.45 percent](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/data/IPMAN) while [aggregate manufacturing hours rose 0.61 percent](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/data/CES3000000016).

Figure

Hours and output can move in opposite directions

Change from the second-quarter average to the third-quarter average in 2022

Real output
-0.45
Aggregate hours
0.61

The scale is centered at zero because one measure fell while the other rose. This is one retrospectively selected example using revised data, not a forecasting test.

Source: Cumulant calculations using the current vintages of [Federal Reserve manufacturing output](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/data/IPMAN) and [BLS aggregate manufacturing hours](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/data/CES3000000016). · Percent · Second to third quarter of 2022

That episode is an illustration, not a backtest. It was selected after the fact and uses revised data, so it cannot tell us how often the PMI correctly predicts official output or what will happen in July 2026.

Figure

Output tests whether volume rose; hours add labor context

How to read the coming government data

Real outputAggregate hoursWhat the combination would suggest
UpUpOutput grew while factories used more employee time
UpFlat or downOutput grew without more aggregate employee time
Flat or downUpFactories used more employee time without confirmed output growth
DownDownThe survey acceleration lacks confirmation from either measure

A preliminary movement close to zero should be treated as inconclusive until later releases show whether its direction survives revision.

Source: Cumulant framework using the definitions of [Federal Reserve manufacturing output](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/IPMAN) and [BLS aggregate manufacturing hours](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CES3000000016). · July-September 2026

The evidence calendar

The first follow-up arrives with July aggregate hours on [August 7](https://www.bls.gov/ces/publications/news-release-schedule.htm). The first direct government estimate of July manufacturing output follows on [August 18](https://www.federalreserve.gov/Releases/G17/release_dates.htm).

[ISM is scheduled to publish its August survey on September 1](https://www.ismworld.org/supply-management-news-and-reports/reports/ism-pmi-reports/pmi/july/). August hours and output then arrive on September 4 and September 18, followed by September hours and output on October 2 and October 16.

Figure

The July signal will be tested in stages

Scheduled releases for output, hours, and the next survey

  1. 2026-08-07

    July factory hours

    First labor-input check

  2. 2026-08-18

    July manufacturing output

    First official volume check

  3. 2026-09-01

    August ISM survey

    Tests whether the reported breadth persisted

  4. 2026-09-04

    August factory hours

    Second labor-input observation

  5. 2026-09-18

    August manufacturing output

    Adds August and may revise July

  6. 2026-10-02

    September factory hours

    Completes the initial third-quarter labor record

  7. 2026-10-16

    September manufacturing output

    Completes the initial third-quarter output record

Source: [BLS Current Employment Statistics schedule](https://www.bls.gov/ces/publications/news-release-schedule.htm), [Federal Reserve G.17 calendar](https://www.federalreserve.gov/Releases/G17/release_dates.htm), and [ISM's July report](https://www.ismworld.org/supply-management-news-and-reports/reports/ism-pmi-reports/pmi/july/). · August-October 2026

One positive July output estimate would be encouraging but still preliminary. A stronger confirmation would combine rising output with persistence into August or September and revisions that do not erase the initial gain.

Bottom line

The best-supported answer is narrow. Production responses supplied most of the July PMI increase recoverable from ISM's rounded components, while slower deliveries supplied a much smaller share. July's headline was therefore not mainly a delivery-delay artifact.

That is a finding about the construction of a survey index, not yet a finding about physical factory output. The [August 18 manufacturing-output release](https://www.federalreserve.gov/Releases/G17/release_dates.htm) is the first scheduled official test of whether July's broader production responses coincided with a real increase in goods produced.

What to watch

  • Whether July aggregate manufacturing hours rise when BLS publishes them on August 7: https://www.bls.gov/ces/publications/news-release-schedule.htm
  • Whether the Federal Reserve's August 18 release confirms that manufacturing output increased in July: https://www.federalreserve.gov/Releases/G17/release_dates.htm
  • Whether stronger production responses persist in ISM's August survey, scheduled for September 1: https://www.ismworld.org/supply-management-news-and-reports/reports/ism-pmi-reports/pmi/july/
  • Whether subsequent revisions preserve any initially reported improvement in factory output and hours

How we did this

  • We treated the [August 3, 2026 ISM report](https://www.ismworld.org/supply-management-news-and-reports/reports/ism-pmi-reports/pmi/july/) as the event and used only information available through that date.
  • We extracted the published June-to-July changes for the five PMI components: new orders 0.7, production 6.3, employment 3.1, supplier deliveries 1.5, and inventories -0.2.
  • We multiplied each component change by its equal 0.20 weight, producing contributions of 0.14, 1.26, 0.62, 0.30, and -0.04 point.
  • We summed those rounded contributions to obtain a reconstructed 2.28-point increase and divided each contribution by 2.28 to calculate its share of that reconstructed movement.
  • We normalized [manufacturing output](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/data/IPMAN) and [aggregate manufacturing hours](https://fred.stlouisfed.org/data/CES3000000016) to January 2026 = 100 by dividing every observation by its January value and multiplying by 100.
  • For the 2022 comparison, we averaged April, May, and June observations for the second quarter, averaged July, August, and September observations for the third quarter, and calculated the percentage change between those averages.
  • We classified the PMI reconstruction as survey attribution, the government output series as the direct official volume check, and aggregate hours as supporting evidence about labor use.
  • We made no causal claim and did not use financial-market movements as evidence of an economic effect.

What this cannot establish

  • ISM publishes the relevant component readings and changes to one decimal place, so the reconstruction cannot recover the unrounded values used in the official PMI.
  • The 0.02-point difference between the 2.28-point reconstruction and the reported 2.3-point increase is consistent with rounding, but unrounded data would be required to determine the exact residual.
  • The analysis uses aggregate component readings rather than company-level responses, so it cannot measure the distribution or size of production changes across individual manufacturers.
  • July government output and hours had not been released as of August 3, 2026, leaving the article unable to confirm a physical-output acceleration.
  • The latest government observations are preliminary or revisable, and later releases may change the first-half comparison.
  • The 2022 output-hours comparison is one retrospectively selected example using the current data vintage, not a representative historical test of PMI forecasting performance.
  • [ISM's page states restrictions on reproducing or creating derivative materials from its content](https://www.ismworld.org/supply-management-news-and-reports/reports/ism-pmi-reports/pmi/july/); publishers should review those terms and obtain permission if required.

This is AI-assisted analysis under stated assumptions; it is not investment advice or a price target. Figures are as of the publication date and trace to the cited sources; markets and disclosures change.

Sources

  1. 01July 2026 ISM Manufacturing PMI Report, Institute for Supply ManagementPrimary
  2. 022026 ISM PMI report release calendar, Institute for Supply ManagementPrimary
  3. 03Industrial Production: Manufacturing data table, Federal Reserve Bank of St. LouisData
  4. 04Industrial Production: Manufacturing series notes, Federal Reserve Bank of St. LouisData
  5. 05Industrial Production and Capacity Utilization summary, July 17, 2026, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve SystemData
  6. 06G.17 release dates, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve SystemPrimary
  7. 07Aggregate weekly hours of manufacturing employees data table, Federal Reserve Bank of St. LouisData
  8. 08Aggregate weekly hours of manufacturing employees series notes, Federal Reserve Bank of St. LouisData
  9. 09Employment Situation Table B-4 for June 2026, U.S. Bureau of Labor StatisticsData
  10. 10Current Employment Statistics news-release dates, U.S. Bureau of Labor StatisticsPrimary
  11. 11North American Industry Classification System, U.S. Census BureauPrimary
US economymanufacturingPMIindustrial productionsupply chainsFederal Reservedata journalismmanufacturing-pmiUnited States

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